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Violence, Security and Democracy: Perverse Interfaces and their
Implications for States and Citizens in the Global South
Jenny Pearce and Rosemary McGee with Joanna Wheeler
Summary
How does violence affect the everyday lives of citizens in the global South?
Researching this theme under the aegis of the Violence, Participation and
Citizenship group of the Citizenship DRC coordinated by IDS, we generated
some answers, but also more questions, which this paper starts to explore.
Why have democratisation processes failed to fulfil expectations of violence
reduction in the global South? How does violence affect democracy and vice
versa? Why does security practice in much of the global South not build secure
environments? When examined empirically from the perspectives of poor
Southern citizens, the interfaces between violence, security and democracy –
assumed in conventional state and democratisation theory to be positive or
benign – are often, in fact, perverse.
Empirically-based reflection on these questions leads us to two propositions,
which the paper then explores through the use of secondary literature. In
essence:
Proposition 1: Violence interacts perversely with democratic institutions,
eroding their legitimacy and effectiveness. Democracy fails to deliver its
promise of replacing the violence with accommodation and compromise, and
democratic process is compromised, with citizens reacting by withdrawing from
public spaces, accepting the authority of non-state actors, or supporting
hard-line responses.
Proposition 2: Security provision is not making people feel more secure. State
responses to rising violence can strengthen state and non-state security actors
committed to reproducing violence, disproportionately affecting the poorest
communities.
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These ‘perverse interfaces’, we argue, warrant research in themselves, rather
than minimal or tangential consideration in research on democracy, as tends to
be the case. Further research needs to adopt fresh epistemological, method-
ological and analytical perspectives and seek to re-think and re-frame
categories and concepts, rather than working within the received wisdoms of
state and democratisation theory.
Keywords: citizenship; violence; security; democracy; democratisation; state.
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1 Introduction: a tale of two
propositions
How does violence affect the everyday lives of citizens in countries, regions
and cities of the global South? This has been the central theme of five years’
work in the Violence, Participation and Citizenship (VPC) group of the
Development Research Centre (DRC) on Citizenship, Participation and
Accountability,1 an international research partnership coordinated by IDS from
2000–2010. While other DRC researchers studied new forms of citizenship that
could help make rights real, the VPC group undertook projects in four countries
to examine how violence affects the exercise of meaningful citizenship and how
efforts to open space for citizenship in such contexts affect the use of violence.
We set out to explore these dynamics in partnership with organisations and
community members in Brazil (Rio de Janeiro), Jamaica (Kingston), Mexico
(Chiapas and Guerrero States) and Nigeria (Kaduna, Kano and Plateau
States). Our investigative frame, developed as a group, was a set of questions
about the scope for participatory social action, the exercise of citizenship, and
processes of peaceful social transformation in contexts of violence. Our
substantive findings have been presented in a range of outputs
(www.drc-citizenship.org and www.ids.ac.uk/go/idspublication/violence-social-
action-and-research) and a series of methodological findings about researching
and acting in violent contexts published as an IDS Bulletin (McGee and Pearce
2009).
1.1 From the micro to the macro
All the countries where we worked were considered democracies. The
existence of multiple forms of violence did not preclude that characterisation.
Nor did the fact that security provision seemed to be fostering violence rather
than diminishing it. This led to important questions about the relationship
between security, democracy and violence. Some perspectives on security
provision have suggested that its defining goal should be the reduction of
violence and the enabling of democratic participation and meaningful exercise
of citizenship rights (Abello Colak and Pearce 2009). The contexts in which we
worked suggested that security provision did quite the opposite. Through
micro-level research, we began to explore how the macro-level political and
security context connected with the everyday violences experienced by our
research participants.
Two concrete propositions emerged, which are the focus of this paper. Firstly,
state ‘security’-oriented responses to violence can undermine key democratic
principles, vitiating political representation, and eroding the meanings and
practices of democratic citizenship, so that classic understandings of state
1 See www.drc-citizenship.org/About_us/index.htm
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formation – with their stress on legitimate monopolisation of violence – fall
apart. In other words, security policies can interact perversely with democracy.
Secondly, security provision can also be perversely related to violence itself.
Rather than reducing violence, state security actors – sometimes in
cooperation with non-state actors – can foster the reproduction of violence in
the name of providing security.
These two propositions constitute the ‘perverse interfaces’ of our title.
Examination of them holds the promise of deeper understanding about the
relationship between states and citizens in the global South. Our concern is not
with security institutions as such and their relationship to democratic
institutions, a subject which has been well explored elsewhere.2 Our interest is
in the interfaces between the three phenomena of violence, security and
democracy. By ‘interface’, we mean a point at which two things – actors,
systems, organisations – not only connect but interact. We contend that the
interactions between them produce effects that are relevant for the nature or
quality of one or other or all of them: in particular, effects that are potentially or
actually detrimental to the exercise of rights and democratic freedoms and
ultimately the opportunities available to the poorest sectors of society. Why is it
that democratisation processes have failed to fulfil the expectations of violence
reduction in the global South? How does violence affect democracy, and
democracy affect violence? Why, despite strong donor support for security
sector reform, does security practice in many parts of the global South still fail
to build secure environments?
To establish the state of knowledge on these questions we conducted a review
of the literature on the relationships between conflict, violence and democracy
(Barrett 2009a, b, c, d). This revealed that distinct literatures on violence,
security and democracy each exist, but none attempts to draw together ways in
which high levels of violence may be reproduced by state as well as non-state
security regimes, or how this affects the prospects for democracy or in turn is
affected by the way democracy functions in the given context. Also, much
literature focusing on the global South is primarily concerned with armed
conflict and the impact of democracy on armed conflict, rather than with the
more multifaceted forms of violence characterising many regions of the global
South, and their impact on democracy, and vice versa. If the full significance of
high levels of violence in the global South is to be appreciated in terms of both
state formation processes and the exercise of meaningful citizenship, then the
subject matter needs to be broadened beyond conventional armed conflict, and
historical and contemporary examples from the global North need to be brought
in for the light they can shed on how war and violence relate to state formation
processes.
All in all, a grounded analysis of the interfaces between violence, security and
democracy is currently absent from contemporary knowledge on the global
South. This Working Paper is an initial exploration of these interfaces, building
on the VPC field research and an analytical review of secondary literature in
the field.
2 See, for example, Luckham (2009) on the connections between security and democracy.
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1.2 Our conceptual and analytical approach
In the citizen-centred view of development espoused by the DRC (Gaventa
2005; Eyben and Ladbury 2006), democratic states are not built through
institutional evolution alone: organised citizens play a role. Where violence
impedes citizen action, it also limits the development of democracy. Citizenship
cannot be exercised in meaningful ways if people fear for their safety. The VPC
group as a whole has sought to understand democracy, citizenship and violent
conflict from the perspectives of poor and marginalised citizens largely through
fieldwork; and then inductively build up situated, richly contextual analyses of
the relationships between these phenomena as lived experiences.
The analytical perspective we adopt in this paper firmly reflects this citizen-
centred view. It approaches the subject matter from a perspective of
understanding complex interactions rather than seeking to reduce violence,
security and democracy to causally-related abstract phenomena. The goal is
not to treat some dimension of democracy as the dependent variable and
manipulate independent variables representing other dimensions, so as to draw
conclusions about the impact of, for instance, corruption on government
effectiveness, or of violence on political stability. Our analytical perspective
resonates with the recent challenge issued by the Centre for the Future State
DRC to policymakers to learn to take ‘an upside-down view of governance’ so
as to understand it better (Centre for the Future State 2010). It also calls to
mind the principle of ‘bottom-up state building’ (Alda and Willman 2009), which
is increasingly invoked by aid agencies despairing over the futility of pursuing
conventional governance programmes in contexts where the character of the
real-life state refuses to fit any mould familiar from state theory. One
consequence of our analytical approach, and what motivates this paper, is that
violence, security and democracy emerge not as distinct spheres of human
experience but as themes needing to be explored together and in terms of their
mutual interactions and impacts on each other.
1.3 What we do in this paper
In the remainder of this introduction, we outline briefly the development of the
VPC group’s conceptual framework and research agenda. The next sections of
the Working Paper discuss our two propositions in turn. In each section, we
first give an account of how the proposition unfolded from our field research.
Insights from the research are presented and drawn on illustratively, along with
relevant data from other projects within and related to the DRC (e.g. McGee
and Pearce 2009).3 We then explore the proposition using conceptual and
theoretical literature, ‘holding a dialogue’ between our empirically-derived
3 For the VPC publication ‘Violence, Social Action and Research’, IDS Bulletin 40.3, editors McGee and
Pearce invited VPC researchers plus non-VPC researchers working in violent contexts in South Africa,
Colombia, El Salvador and Sri Lanka to write about their research methodology. Although the research
on which these articles were based was conducted beyond the bounds of the VPC, we therefore refer
to these published articles in our discussions of VPC work.
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proposition and the conceptual and theoretical literature on democracy,
democratisation, development and violence, bringing to bear insights from this
literature to deepen the proposition and build up a contemporary picture of the
state of knowledge about the relationships between violence, security and
democracy. We conclude in Section 3 with a bolder proposition, substantiated
by the dialogue: that classic definitions of the State which assign to it the
legitimate monopoly of violence in a given territory, are called into question by
contemporary realities in many parts of the global South, in particular the kinds
of environments we are describing. This proposition calls for new approaches
to such contexts, with much greater sensitivity to the factors and actors which
are fuelling violence and insecurity and support for those seeking to limit or
eliminate them.
1.4 Violence, Participation and Citizenship (VPC): research in the
heartlands of violence
In much of the DRC research, violence emerged indirectly as a variable which
affected the political processes under study. The VPC research group was the
only one to focus on violence per se, and bring it into the foreground as a
variable in understanding democracy and citizenship. The group focused its
field research in Jamaica, Brazil, Nigeria and Mexico, and later extended its
collaboration to researchers in other countries (Colombia, South Africa, El
Salvador and Sri Lanka) in the context of its exploration of methodologies for
researching violence. All these countries are considered to be ‘democracies’.
Apart from Jamaica, Sri Lanka and Colombia, they mostly underwent
transitions to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s. Sri Lanka and Colombia
have established electoral systems but have both been immersed in protracted
civil war, in the former case brought to a close in 2009. Jamaica has a long-
established party system but also a history of violent enclaves in which
politicians initially built violently partisan cultures in the country’s poorest urban
areas, which over the last decade or more have been taken over by drugs
trafficking and gangster mafias.
The VPC group developed innovative methods for researching with the
‘researched’ in order not only to generate mutual understanding about
violence, but also to reflect on social action within violent contexts. We asked
how, in contexts of violence, people can and do begin processes of social
action aimed at diminishing violence and building citizenship. Our
understanding of violence was informed by earlier work on socialisation
spaces, power and violence, and intergenerational transmissions of violence
through time and space (Pearce 2006; 2007). In our first workshops, the group
engaged with these ideas in an iterative fashion, which generated new insights
on these phenomena from different contextual perspectives, as well as new
questions to frame the field research (Pearce 2008).
The VPC group did not align itself with one definition of violence. Instead we
acknowledged diverse definitional approaches which could illuminate particular
aspects of violence in the different research sites. At the theoretical level, we
drew variously on definitions of violence as direct intentional physical hurt on
11
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the body of oneself or another; as symbolic and ‘a form of power’ according to
Bourdieu (2004); and as cultural and structural violence, differentiated by
Galtung (1969), in which premature illnesses and death can be attributed to
structural inequalities and oppressions. We studied violence in both its
chronic4 and its acute manifestations and in terms of both physical and
psychological intentional effects (Pearce 2009: 6). Each researcher built,
informed and extended his/her own understanding of violence through empiri-
cal work. Notes from VPC meetings illustrate the range of contexts for the
group’s empirical work on violence, and a corresponding range of perceptions
of its meaning and of the significance of how it is defined and operationalised
(Pearce 2008: 2–7).
The research was micro-level, focusing on everyday individual and community
experiences of violence, in private as well as public spaces and their impact on
participation and the meaningful exercise of citizenship. The fieldwork
generated a body of ethnographic data around how people experience violence
across the spaces of socialisation, particularly those of home, school and
neighbourhood. In some contexts, violence has its own lexicon and language,
such as parlache, the slang of Medellín’s urban poor, which is replete with
expressions for violence. We developed insights into the relationships of power
and authority to violence, particularly in contexts of chronic violence. We found
various patterns of authority emerging in such contexts, where state and non-
state actors compete to become security providers and protection suppliers.
We became very interested in the impact of violence at this everyday level on
the nature of democracy and state formation and state-building underway in
each of the contexts. An assumption is often made that state formation,
state-building and democracy will ultimately reduce violence. It became
increasingly obvious that we were observing the embedding of violence ever
deeper within society, particularly in the everyday lives of the poorest. Most of
the VPC research found violence to play an ongoing role in the formation and
maintenance of the states where the research was conducted; state formation
or democratic transitions and consolidation processes to be somehow
connected to the persistence of violence in micro-level everyday experience;
and a key factor in citizens’ perceptions of and relationships with the state to
be the state’s performance as regards violence, including the kind of security
the state sought to provide and the way it provided it. There was a complex
social basis for the distinct perceptions. The poorest, who experience insecurity
on a daily basis, can be as inclined as the wealthier sectors, to support
authoritarian and repressive solutions. However, these do not have to come
directly from the state. When violent non-state actors offer solutions to
everyday problems of insecurity and economic survival, they may win social
4 Chronic violence is a term to describe contexts in which levels of violence are measured across three
dimensions of intensity, space and time. A working definition is where rates of violent death are at
least twice the average for the country income category, where these levels are sustained for five
years or more and where acts of violence not necessarily resulting in death are recorded at high levels
across several socialisation spaces, such as the household, the neighbourhood, and the school,
contributing to the further reproduction of violence over time (Pearce 2007: 07). Such high levels may
be recorded in sub-national contexts as opposed to countrywide averages.
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support even when they end up in conflict with the state. The more difficult
phenomenon to explain is why others in such contexts continue the search for
non-violent solutions. These examples of citizens’ social action in violent
contexts informed a key finding of the research: that democratic civil
participation is possible even in violent contexts and is a foundation for new
kinds of responses to the problem. This is where the group’s methodology and
conceptual framework enable it to bring into focus forms of social action which
outsiders rarely see when they categorise violent neighbourhoods.
It was evident from our research that levels of violence were not diminishing
but increasing in most of the VPC field sites, and in those of other researchers
with whom we collaborated. Surveys we conducted showed that many people
felt unsafe in parts of their community, with women and young people under
the age of 30 feeling this particularly strongly (Justino, Leavy and Valli 2009:
46). In Jamaica, for instance, only 44 per cent of children felt safe as school
and 48 per cent per cent in their community. In Mexico, 28 per cent of
respondents reported violent episodes in the family, often linked to alcohol
consumption. At the same time, people drew solace and strength from their
community relations. Faith in the ability of the state to protect them was not
apparent in these communities (ibid.).
Given that most of the countries where we worked had been through
democratic transitions or, as in the case of Jamaica, had a prior history of
electoral politics, it was reasonable to ask why democracy had not reduced or
tamed this violence. Also, given the emphasis on security sector reform by
external donors since the democratisation processes of the 1980s got
underway in the global South, why did our field sites show ever increasing
insecurity, often attributable to state as well as non-state armed actors, who
offered forms of ‘protection’ that themselves generated insecurity? It appeared
conceivable that the high levels of violence reported in national level statistics
might be outcomes of more democracy, rather than aberrations.
At the joint launch of two IDS Bulletins in May 2009 (McGee and Pearce 2009;
Luckham et al. 2009) on ‘Violence, Social Action and Research’ and
‘Transforming Security and Development in an Unequal World’ respectively, we
debated these questions in a wider forum. Attention focused on how different
understandings, experiences and contexts of violence relate to ongoing
debates about the meaning and practice of security; and how security policy
and practice might be conceived as enabling of citizen participation rather than
about repression and punishment (Abello Colak and Pearce 2009). It became
apparent that under regimes of ‘security provision’ that lacked this approach,
violence tended to reproduce itself rather than diminish, with state and other
actors playing key roles in that reproduction, albeit in different forms across the
case studies. This led us to our two themes, on the interfaces between
democracy and violence and security and violence, respectively. Each of these
will be explored through the generation of propositions arising from the field
work and subsequently refined and revised through the relevant academic
literature.
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2 Does democracy reduce violence?
VPC research showed that the activities of non-state violent actors can have
very direct impacts on the experience and quality of democratic governance.
The ‘dons’ in Kingston, the militias in Rio, the paramilitaries in Medellín (Baird
2009: 76; Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris 2007), acting with state sponsorship or
under the state’s blind eye, actively intervene in procedural democracy, for
example by using real or threatened force in electoral processes in favour of
the incumbent government, elected representatives or candidates to election.
Research in Jamaica reveals:
[The donmen] have been used to influence […] constituencies in the
voting. They are armed and can be mobilised by political parties and are
under the command of an area leader […], armed, monolithic, belonging to
one or other party, under the command of a donman.
(Professor Horace Levy, 20 April 2007, authors’ interview notes)
Trade-offs between crime protection for the wealthy and human security for the
poor appears to be part of the political strategy of parties, politicians and other
state actors. The ‘garrisons’ of inner-city Kingston originate in social housing
communities set up by two political parties. Intrinsic to their crime and armed
conflict dynamics is their function as electoral constituencies, mobilised by
political parties via armed ‘area leaders’ operating with the complicity of the
police, who deliver the inhabitants’ votes (Professor Horace Levy 20 April 2007,
authors’ interview notes). Paramilitary groups in Medellín, Colombia, embedded
in communities, wield the threat or exercise of violence as part of a logic of
local political control (Baird 2009), in which the state is implicated through its
tolerance of – or, as some argue, collusion with – such groups as part of a
broader counterinsurgency logic in the country. The role some paramilitary
have played in funding candidates of the right at election times brings these
dynamics directly into the political sphere (Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris 2007).
In the case of Rio de Janeiro’s state-sponsored militias, Wheeler observes how
the Rio militias use the existing machinery of political clientelism, such as
relationships with political parties, and their ability to mediate access to
government and infrastructure, as a means for perpetuating their control. The
political-territorial dimension of their control is reinforced by the use of visible
and physical symbols: they deliberately occupy the physical spaces of
governance such as residents’ association buildings, and mark their control
through a physical presence in the form of patrols, cameras, barriers and wall
murals.
Living in the midst of violence transforms citizens’ perceptions of their physical
and political environment. This takes various forms, but in the long run can
weaken commitment to democracy and encourage people to support forms of
authority which guarantee stability of sorts, although backed by threat and
coercion. When citizens lose faith in the state as a provider of security,
contracting privately provided security arrangements and retreating into gated
communities is only an option for the middle and wealthy classes (Moncrieffe
2009: 68 on Kingston, Jamaica; Wheeler 2009: 11 on Rio de Janeiro). Poor
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and marginalised citizens resort to other coping strategies, various kinds of
which were identified in VPC and other DRC research: withdrawal into a
truncated form of citizenship; accepting the parallel authority of non-state
violent actors; and supporting or even implementing themselves hard-line and
authoritarian ‘security’ policies and actions.
Faced with pervasive danger and the visible and symbolic appropriation of the
physical spaces of citizenship by armed actors, citizens in Rio’s favelas
withdraw from public spaces and from using public facilities, leaving them to
the militias and drugs gangs (Wheeler 2005 and 2009). Inner-city residents in
Kingston observe limits on physical and social space imposed by the violent
actors, which circumscribe their social encounters as well as their movements
(Moncrieffe 2008: 17). Cortez Ruiz’s research in Mexico attests to the
difficulties social organisations experience in trying to increase their
effectiveness by working collectively because of intimidation and mutual lack of
trust (Cortez Ruiz 2009). Abah and Okwori’s research in Nigeria attests to an
extreme form of withdrawal into versions of citizenship based on severely
truncated spatial and geographical dimensions:
A new settlement pattern has emerged in Kaduna, Kano and Plateau as a
result of the spate of violent eruptions. Some people have moved to
enclaves where they feel safer. These are well-known as Muslim or
Christian areas and each side is afraid of venturing into ‘enemy’ territory.
(Abah, Okwori and Olubo 2009: 21)
Elsewhere, rather than withdraw into versions of citizenship that are spatially
restricted or qualitatively truncated, people reach and maintain states of
co-existence with violent actors and actions. A community organisation in a
neighbourhood of Medellín, Colombia, where paramilitaries grew up and went
to school with organisation members and are firmly socially embedded,
consciously employs a strategy of ‘bailándolos’ or ‘keeping them sweet’ –
literally, taking them for a dance (Baird 2009: 74). This consists of maintaining
open dialogue with them to help identify possible threats to the organisation’s
security, while maintaining a critical distance from their paramilitary activities
and sometimes denouncing these. Moncrieffe’s research on gangs in Kingston
reveals a distinction in local perceptions between ‘community gangs’ and
‘criminal gangs’. The former are ‘those who want an alternative’ and, although
known to be armed and involved in petty crime, also ‘get involved in defending
the community’. As such, they are perceived by some residents as allies
against the ‘criminal gangs’ and by some ‘good police’ as ‘guys [who] are
trapped and can be turned round’ (Moncrieffe 2008: 40).
‘Parallel communities’ have emerged in some locations, involving competing
forms of governance in voids left by the state but which meet basic and
security needs through violent tactics. In these parallel governance structures,
the service provision or dispute resolution roles of official governance
structures are severely compromised by the violent or insecure context.
Citizens turn to any actor who will guarantee a measure of stability, even at the
cost of democratic freedoms. Thus insecurity and perverse security provision
can enhance demands for authoritarian and hard-line responses, further
IDS WORKING PAPER 357
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5 The WHO (2002: 10) put the average rates of violent death in low income countries at 32.1 per
100,000 compared to 14.4 in high income countries.
weakening democracy building. When the social organisations of townships like
Khayelitsha, South Africa, stray beyond peaceful and legal means and express
their demands for improved services through violent protest, they enjoy the
support of a full quarter of the residents surveyed (Thompson and Nleya 2010).
These observations offer insights into the real scope for people to exercise
democratic rights in violent contexts, and into how they perceive and
experience democracy and its accessories. They lead to the first proposition.
2.1 Democracy and violence: exploring the interface
Proposition 1: Violence interacts perversely with democratic institutions,
eroding their legitimacy and effectiveness. In such contexts, the idea of
democracy fails to live up to its promise of replacing the violent resolution
of conflict with accommodation and compromise, and thereby reducing
violence. Indeed, political representatives themselves make use of state
or non-state violence for political and sometimes electoral ends.
Democratic process is compromised as citizens react by withdrawing
from public spaces and solutions, accepting the parallel authority of non-
state armed actors, or supporting hard-line and authoritarian responses in
the name of security.
The micro level field research generated a proposition about the macro level
interfaces between democracy and violence which, in essence, contests the
assumption that the coexistence of violence with democracy is unproblematic.
In order to explore this proposition further, we discuss it here in the light of
recent academic debates on the relationship between the two.
There has been a resurgence of interest within the academic community in the
relationship between democracy and violence in recent years, which has
involved a revision of the accepted wisdom that democracy reduces violence
and civil war. The ‘third wave of democratisation’, which was associated with
the end of the Cold War, gave rise to optimism and the idea of the ‘democratic
peace’. This proved to be seriously misplaced. The post Cold War world
ushered in brutal internal wars across many parts of the Global South, Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union, dubbed ‘New Wars’ (Kaldor 1999)
because of their intrastate character, massive human rights violations and
connections to organised crime. Though levels of armed conflict have declined,
levels of violence remain very high.5 This section will first of all look at four
quantitatively based studies on the relationship between democracy, armed
and political violence. It will then widen the discussion to social violences and
democracy.
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Disappointment at the failure of democratisation to reduce armed violence led
to studies seeking more reliable insights into whether there is such a thing as a
‘democratic peace’. Hegre et al. (2001) took data from 152 countries over the
period 1816 to 1992 to explore whether historical evidence confirms that the
process of democratising results in civil peace. They focus on civil war, defined
in terms of military action, involvement of the national government, effective
resistance (ratio of fatalities of the weaker to the stronger forces) and at least
1,000 battle deaths (ibid.: 36), and sought to move beyond the existing body of
research which had correlated levels of democracy with internal (armed) con-
flict. Observing that semi-democracies 6 – those regimes intermediate between
democracy and autocracy – have a higher risk of civil conflict than either
extreme, they sought to establish whether this observation meant that states in
political transition experience more violence; in other words, whether the
problem is regime change or level of democracy. They conclude that semi-
democracies or intermediate regimes are indeed most prone to civil war, but
that the risks diminish as the society moves back or forward to either
democracy or autocracy. However, the latter offers increased risks of renewed
civil unrest and democracy increases the possibility of stability. The short term
effects of democratisation are similar to that for autocratisation, but, the
authors argue, (ibid.: 43) the long-term effects are different:
The most reliable path to stable democratic peace in the long run is to
democratise as much as possible. A change in that direction ensures the
strongest ratchet effect in terms of consolidating political institutions and
makes it less likely that the country will slide back into a state in which it is
more prone to civil war.
(Ibid.: 44)
Two other quantitative analyses of the relationships between armed conflict,
violence and democracy have suggested that the effects of democracy on
violence are more complicated, particularly in ethnically divided countries of the
global South. Stewart has explored the connection between horizontal
inequalities (inequalities in economic, social and political dimensions or cultural
status between culturally defined groups – see Stewart 2008: 3) and ethnic and
religious armed conflict in a volume of essays dedicated to this theme (Stewart
2008). Østby, in the same volume, focuses on the relationship between
horizontal inequalities, conflict and political conditions, that is, the impact of
regime type. She uses data on civil conflict in up to 55 developing countries
between 1986 and 2003 7 (Østby 2008). She proposes that ‘it is democratic
regimes that suffer from the most serious effects of horizontal inequalities’
(p 139), and challenges the assumption that democracies are by definition
6 The idea of ‘semi democracy’ is not fine-tuned and many authors in the debate on democracy and
violence tend to rely on the formal procedural qualities of democracy rather than the approach of this
Working Paper which emphasises the substantive meaning it gives to citizenship and social action.
7 Østby used data from the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset which includes every armed conflict
between a state government and an organised opposition group that caused at least 25 battle related
deaths per year, a much lower threshold than the Hegre et al. study, but still focussed on battle related
deaths, i.e.armed conflict.
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more responsive than autocracies to group grievances. While democracies with
low horizontal inequalities are the least at risk of conflict, those with high levels
of such inequalities are particularly at risk despite democratic rule and political
inclusion. Democracies do not by definition satisfy basic needs universally and
ensure equity. In a democracy, opportunities and grievances are both present.
Although it is claimed that democracies offer peaceful mechanisms through
which to influence public policy, Østby suggests that if these do not then
reduce the gap between the expected and actual outcomes for the relatively
disadvantaged group, the outcome may be greater frustration and conflict.
Therefore, the violence potential of socioeconomic horizontal inequalities may
be stronger for democracies and semi-democracies than for autocracies, it is
argued. This enables us to ask questions about the high levels of violence
which have accompanied elections in some parts of the global South around
ethnic divisions. In 2007 electoral violence hit the headlines in Nigeria and
Kenya. It appears that groups with a strong sense of grievances may be ‘willing
to accept democratic institutions in principle’, but ‘not be willing to accept the
transfer of power that is involved’ (Østby 2008: 140). Stewart et al. in the same
volume conclude their analysis of the political dimensions of horizontal in
equalities in relationship to violence risks by pointing to the design of the
electoral system and rules of political competition, the composition of the
executive and the way decisions are taken, the decentralisation process and
employment policies toward the bureaucracy, the police and the army (Stewart
et al. 2008: 306). They also include the issue of citizenship, drawing on an
essay in the same volume (Gibney 2008) which argues that as citizenship
confers control over key social, economic and political goods, its distribution
and meaning will be very pertinent to the discussion of horizontal inequalities
and the propensity for violence and armed conflict. In other words, the
character of the state and the meaning of citizenship, in addition to regime
form, are highly significant to the discussion of violence and armed conflict,
seen through the lens of horizontal inequalities analysis.
Collier’s (2009) discussion of democracy and violence is also statistically
based, focused on the ‘bottom billion’, those people living in the poorest
countries in the world. Collier argues that there are two basic reasons why
political violence should decline with democracy: accountability and legitimacy.
Governments in democratic environments should be driven to perform better
for ordinary citizens because of the electoral imperative. Democracies therefore
improve government performance and thus reduce the sources of grievance
which can generate anti-government violence. In a democracy, citizens agree
to some basic rules around the right to a mandate for a democratically elected
government; opposition to those rules cannot legitimately extend to the use of
violence. Collier set out to test these arguments using data for most countries
in the world since 1960, taking a broader view of political violence than armed
conflict, and including assassinations, riots and guerrilla activity as well as civil
war. He found that democracy reduced the risk of political violence in middle-
income countries, but significantly increased it in countries with per capita
incomes below USD 2,700, or USD 7 per person per day.
In these poorest countries, argues Collier, the logic of accountability and
legitimacy do not work in the same way as in wealthier countries. Amongst the
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factors he identifies are the information flows: voters cannot always assess
responsibility for economic crisis, which quite often is due to international
market factors such as commodity price crashes rather than government
performance per se. Secondly, Collier cites the tendency to vote according to
ethnic loyalty as a particular limitation on the fulfilment of democratic potential
which remains common across the ‘bottom billion’. As votes become ‘simply
frozen in blocs of rival identities’ (ibid.: 27), they lack sensitivity to government
performance. Collier gives the example of Kenya, whose election in 2007 was
marred by the deaths of some 1,000 Kenyans in ethnic violence. The Kenyan
economy had previously been enjoying the fastest growth for two decades, and
this had benefited not only the Kikuyu in power, but also the Luo in opposition,
However, there was no way the latter were going to vote for Kibaki, the
candidate of the Kikuyu. Such factors also encourage the government to
reward their loyal, ethnic followers rather than govern for everyone, thus also
undermining the idea of the state as provider of public goods and encouraging
corruption.
The literature we have reviewed so far draws our attention to weaknesses in
democracy, particularly in ethnically diverse societies, in guaranteeing civil
peace. The argument that such peace is more likely the more established the
democracy, and that autocracies are less likely to guarantee long term peace,
is still on the table. Collier looks at societies where democracy does not go
much further than elections: the story is more positive where there are real
checks and balances in place (ibid.: 44). He finds that not only have elections
hindered economic reform processes, they have given positive incentives to
bad government. His conclusion is stark: ‘Democracy, at least in the form it has
usually taken to date in the societies of the bottom billion, does not seem to
enhance the prospects of internal peace. On the contrary, it seems to increase
proneness to political violence. Probably related to this failure to secure social
peace, democracy has not yet produced accountable and therefore legitimate
government’ (ibid.: 49).
The weight given to ethnic identity in this argument echoes the sentiment of
Michael Mann that ethnic conflict is the ‘dark side of democracy’ (Mann 2005).
Mann maintains that democracies harbour the risk that majorities will tyrannise
minorities, a danger exacerbated when demos is conflated with ethnos. Of
course, there are counter arguments which suggest that there are many
triggers to such dangers which do not reside in some essentialist character of
ethnic loyalty (Turton 1997), and indeed trace some of the problem to the
conscious manipulation and politicisation of those loyalties by colonial powers
and political leaders. But the debate highlights the ongoing tensions between
different notions of democracy and citizenship and whether in practice
democracy encourages real power-sharing between people of different
identities, beliefs and values. Where it does not, the likelihood of violence is
greater.
To fully grasp the implications of these insights, we need to return to the
question of definitions of violence. Hegre et al. (2001) and Stewart (2008) focus
on armed violence, while Collier (2009) broadens this somewhat to political
violence. However, the VPC research was concerned with much wider
manifestations of everyday violence, and in particular the recurring and
IDS WORKING PAPER 357
19
8 This corresponds to some extent to definitions of structural violence, i.e. avoidable and premature
deaths due to the embedded inequalities and lack of public prioritisation in a given society. However,
these deaths occur outside as well as inside war situations.
9 The broad definition of violence used by the authors is ‘The intentional use of force (actual or
threatened), with arms or explosives, against a person or group that undermines people-centred
security and/or sustainable development’ (Geneva Declaration 2008: 2). This definition combines
components of direct physical, cultural and structural violence, which were included with different
emphases in the VPC research.
reproducing forms of social violence. While Hegre et al. use ‘domestic violence’
– rather unconventionally – to refer to internal war, the VPC group sought
greater terminological precision, putting ‘violence’ into the foreground of the
analysis rather than ‘war’. For the VPC, internal violences encompass both war
related deaths but also non war related deaths, and the latter includes high
levels of violence in interpersonal and intimate socialisation spaces as well as
those of community and neighbourhood, including school, prisons and other
socialisation spaces where violence can easily become embedded and even
chronic.
The case for wider definition is twofold. Firstly, we would argue that the
reproductive qualities of violence can only be fully understood by taking into
account the multiple forms of violence and the differential social impacts.
Secondly, because these other forms of violence in fact account for many more
deaths than conflict related violences. The Global Burden of Armed Violence
report (Geneva Declaration 2008) has produced the most systematic overview
of this yet. Their statistics show that over 740,000 have died every year directly
or indirectly from armed violence in recent years, both conflict related and non
conflict related. 540,000 of these have been violent deaths, while others have
been the victims of the indirect impact of wars on civilians, such as
malnutrition, dysentery and other illnesses.8 Between 2004 and 2007, ‘only’
52,000 of the 540,000 violent deaths were conflict related. This is a
conservative estimate as these are the recorded figures, but as the authors
conclude, it is clear that the overwhelming source of violent death in the world
is not armed conflict (ibid.: 2). The authors’ definition of violence ranges from
large-scale war-related violence through inter-communal and collective
violence, organised criminal and economically motivated violence, political
violence by groups and individuals competing for power, to inter-personal and
gender-based violence.9 The authors calculate that the annual cost of violence
in non-conflict settings due to violent deaths and in terms of lost productivity is
US$95 billion, but may rise to US$163 billion or 0.14 per cent of annual global
GDP (ibid.). These figures do not include the impact of injuries and
psychological trauma on individuals caught up in the midst of these violences.
If we compare Collier’s ‘bottom billion’ with country-level homicide figures, then
it becomes apparent that a focus on the ‘bottom billion’ does not lead to a full
appreciation of the dimensions of violence facing humanity and particularly that
part of humanity living in the global South. Firstly, figures for homicidal violence
are high in most of the selected ‘bottom billion’ countries, suggesting that not
just political violence but social violence is pervasive there. Secondly, violence
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is pervasive not only in ‘bottom billion’ countries. Table 2.1 compares levels of
social violence (measured in terms of homicides) in selected ‘bottom billion’
countries with data for the middle-income countries where VPC research was
conducted. The middle-income countries exhibit high levels of violence. Some
of them have emerged from (Guatemala and Sri Lanka) or are in the midst of
(Colombia) civil war, others not. All of them are considered democracies.
Much of the violence is accounted for by the spread of drugs trafficking and
other illicit activities, which have a great deal to do with failures in economic
policy and the provision of jobs and services in the poorest areas of rapidly
urbanising societies. Drug-trafficking makes available the means (i.e. guns) for
violent expressions of such grievances, and accounts for high levels of
violence in struggles over turf and drug-trafficking corridors. However,
explanations are still needed for why it has had such deep effects in certain
social locations, drawing in poor and frustrated young men attracted by the
possibilities of quick riches and status. There is also a connection between the
higher-income, drug-producing and -trafficking and violent societies and
Collier’s ‘bottom billions’, some of which cocaine traffickers from Colombia
have turned into platforms for drug exports, notably parts of West Africa. In
turn, these connections have huge impacts on the consumer, importing, high-
income countries, where gun crime and violence in poor and socially deprived
enclaves of big cities is closely associated with the drug trade.
In other words, we cannot see violence only in terms of armed and political
violence concentrated in the war-torn impoverished countries of the global
South. Social violence is very high in relatively wealthy (lower middle/middle
income), highly unequal but ‘democratic’ countries of the global South. Its
reproduction through security policies implemented by state and non-state
actors, often in the name of a war on drugs and illicit crime, has global, if
differential, repercussions on violence and social problems in the low- and
high-income countries of the world.
War histories and authoritarian or dictatorial legacies are part of the
explanation for the high levels of social violence in these wealthier countries of
the global South. In countries recovering from civil war, the connections
between civil- war-related violence and non-civil-war-related violences are
strong (Moser and McIlwaine 2001). The legacy of violence will not necessarily
be halted by a negotiated agreement or pact between previous combatants. In
fact, the converse is likely to take place. Living with protracted everyday
violence in multiple forms has profound impacts on the fabric of society as well
as individual life stories, with strong potential for intergenerational
transmissions of violence through gendered socialisation processes (Pearce
2007). Young men are often encouraged to interpret their identity as males in
terms of their willingness to use violence, as is clear from powerful evidence of
the role of young men as both perpetrators and victims. Worldwide, the
perpetration of homicide is highest among males aged 15–29 years (19.4 per
100 000), followed closely by males aged 30–44 years (18.7 per 100 000)
(WHO 2002: 10).These tendencies are not transformed overnight. In addition,
protracted armed conflicts have deep impacts within state institutions and on
state actors and leave fertile ground for the criminal activities which often
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Table 2.1 Non-war violence: homicide levels in selected ‘bottom
billion’ countries and lower-middle/middle-income VPC research
countries 10
Country GDP per capita IS$ Intentional homicide rate
per 100,000 population
Low estimate/
high estimate
Afghanistan 366 5.2/36.0
Bolivia 1,720 3.7/5.3
Cambodia 711 3.7/18.5
Chad 770 19.0
Cote d’Ivoire 1,137 45.7
Democratic Republic
of the Congo 182 35,2
Eritrea 336 15.9
Guinea 386 17.3
Kenya 783 6.7/20.8
Nigeria 1,370 1.8/17.7
South Africa 5,678 39.5/69.0
Jamaica 5,438 33.7/55.2
El Salvador 3,605 56.4/57.5
Mexico 10,232 10.9/11.3
Brazil 8,205 26.2/30.8
Colombia 5,416 45.5/61.1
Sri Lanka 2,013 6.9/7.2
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 2008. The first ten countries are from Collier’s
(2009: 238) list of 58 bottom billion countries. The rest are seven of the eight middle income countries which
were included in the VPC research (Nigeria, the eighth, is in the bottom billion).
10 These UNODC data are compiled from several datasets, hence there is a ‘low’ and a ‘high’ estimate.
UNODC does not include deaths from armed conflict where killings are committed by more or less
cohesive groups of up to several hundred rather than by individuals or small groups. It does include
domestic disputes that end in a killing, interpersonal violence, violent conflicts over land resources,
violence between gangs over turf or control, and predatory violence and killing by armed groups.
Homicide statistics are recognised as a fairly robust indicator of high levels of other forms of violence
(Elsner 2008). GDP per capita figures are taken from http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD (accessed 15 December 2010)
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flourish in such contexts. This is also true of countries emerging from various-
forms of authoritarianism and institutionalised violence (e.g.state generated
human rights abuses). Norstrum (2004) has looked at these ‘shadows of war’,
and argues in relationship to post-apartheid South Africa:
It’s very hard to define the complex relations of a society or state that is
technically at peace (by virtue of a formal settlement) while still operating
through war-forged institutions (by virtue of practicalities instituted in
conflict that have remained unchanged). Yet in these transitional times, we
can uncover answers as to why war-style human rights violations continue
after a war has ended, and why civil violence and organized crime
frequently skyrocket with the signing of a peace accord or a widely
supported political transitions. In these conditions the complexities of
power become apparent, as old and new forms of authority coalesce into
hybrid and unexpected forms of governance.
(2004: 145)
Norstrum quotes from Brandon Hamber, who took his studies of violence and
political transition in South Africa to Brazil and concluded starkly ‘New forms of
violence follow the move to democracy’ (ibid. 2004: 152). Such a proposition
has also been argued in relationship to Russia (Pridemore and Kim 2006), a
case which further strains the assumption about the relationship between
violence and democracy. The authors concede that the transition in Russia was
weak in a number of measures of democratisation, but the general trend was
towards political competition, moral individualism and the free market. They
test Durkheim’s hypothesis that acute political crisis results in increased
homicide rates because it threatens previous shared sentiments and collective
norms. The Russian homicide rate more than tripled between 1988 and 1994,
and even though it decreased afterwards, it was still twice as high in 2000 as a
decade earlier. In their statistical analysis at national and regional level, the
authors control for other factors which might influence the homicide rate, such
as socio-economic factors and alcohol consumption in order to isolate the
effects of political change. While this study does not precisely confirm
Hamber’s assertion, it does suggest that rapid transitions can generate
increased social violence in certain cultural contexts, in particular where
previous collective social norms and traditions have been violently disrupted.
While this Working Paper focuses on the global South rather than Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union, Pridemore and Kim’s argument resonates
with the fate of parts of the global South, which were encouraged to make
rapid political as well as economic transitions in the 1980s and onwards. This
combination of transitions and the disruptions to communal ways of life and of
generating the means to life, may well explain something of the high levels of
violence recorded in some parts of the global South.11 It also draws attention to
the impact of war on population displacement and movement, which involves
11 It has also been argued, drawing again on Durkheim, that the liberation of collective bonds ultimately
leads to declines in homicide rates (Elsner 2001: 632).
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dramatic and traumatic shifts in ways of life and the values they give rise to
and reflect. These ideas all strengthen the propositions about the ‘danger zone’
of intermediate states of democratic transition (semi-democracy) even in lower-
middle to middle-income countries.
Again we return to the question of definitions, this time of democracy. The
extent to which violence might escalate or at least not diminish much in
democratic contexts, depends on assumptions about democracy. Collier
emphasises that inclusive elections can actually contribute to violence. What
happens if one extends the understanding of democracy beyond procedural
components, such as free and fair elections, to its full meaning and potential?
Karstedt (2006) has explored some of the sociological changes which underpin
and are in turn fostered by democratic political orders compared with autocratic
ones, seeking to identify generic features of democratic societies which
contribute to relatively low levels of violence and features that increase
violence. She stresses the non-state and non-institutional features of
democracy and autocracy, that is, the social mechanisms, values and
practices. She does not limit herself to the global South. Her understanding of
democracy is that it is fundamentally a project of inclusion. (ibid.: 57),
something that inevitably gives rise to tensions between the goal of social
integration and the recognition and even encouragement of individual choice
and autonomy. She concludes that:
Democracies have a potential for waves of violence, or even continuously
high levels of violence, if the built-in tensions of the liberal inclusionary
project reach temporarily or continuously high levels.
(Ibid.: 60)
This echoes the conclusion of Østby (2008: 155) with respect to democracy,
violence and horizontal inequalities: ‘countries with sharp socioeconomic
horizontal inequalities, despite democratic rule and a seemingly politically
inclusive system, may be particularly at risk of conflict’. Other evidence shows
that inequalities of all kinds correlate strongly with violent crime (Wilkinson and
Pickett 2009). The combination of increased individualisation and expectations
within democratic societies on the one hand, and the frustration of these by
unequal social structures and opportunities on the other, appears to generate
increased levels of violence in the global North as well as the South. This is
further exacerbated when the model of liberal inclusion is challenged by
systematic ethnicised discrimination. But even in consolidated and advanced
democracies, where liberal inclusion is only practiced in terms of formal
political rights rather than substantive social and economic ones, levels of
violence can rise. Karstedt adds the point that this can be intensified when the
process of commodification through market individualism is not ‘counter-
balanced by values of the common good and civic attitudes’ (ibid.: 60).
A final study which deserves more attention than can be given here, is that by
North, Wallis and Weingast on Violence and Social Orders (North et al. 2009).
This volume puts violence at the centre of the analysis, in this case as part of
an ambitious historical review of how societies confront the problem of
violence, and raises deep issues of definition too, this time of ‘state’ and
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‘society’. Their questions go to the heart of those coming out of the VPC micro
level research. By what logics do social orders emerge to contain violence? By
discussing ‘social orders’ rather than regime form, they effectively pose a range
of distinct questions about the various ways in which violence is contained or
not contained in any given society. The authors understand social orders as the
patterns of social organisation which ‘simultaneously give individuals control
over resources and social functions and, by doing so, limit the use of violence
by shaping the incentives faced by individuals and groups who have access to
violence’ (p xi). They describe ‘natural states’, where a dominant coalition of
elites protect each other’s privileges and access to resources, while building
incentives for elite cooperation, for example to safeguard their rents from the
impacts of ongoing violence. These can be relatively stable but not static
states, and occur in a variety of modes (ibid.: 21). The authors explore
potential transitions from fragile to mature natural states. Of particular interest
in this book is that the authors do not assume a ‘single actor’ model of the
state, so that, instead, shifting elite alliances can be identified as the incentives
to refrain from violence emerge. Amongst these elites are violence specialists,
leaders of organisations which remain able and willing to use violence and
transform themselves into institutions that serve not society as a whole, but
elites, who might cooperate but also fall apart at given moments. The authors
argue that 85 per cent of the world’s population and 175 countries live in varied
forms of ‘natural states’ (ibid.). By contrast, ‘open access states’ control
violence through a different logic, constructing powerful military and police
bodies which serve the political system and use deterrence and punishment.
In other words, formal institutions control violence via their capacity to enforce
rules impersonally (ibid.: 16). This North et al. approach encourages us to look
at the elite coalitions and pacts which lie behind the approach to violence in
any given society, rather than the existence or not of procedural forms of
democracy.
How then do we answer our question, does democracy reduce violence? North,
Wallis and Weingast suggest that perhaps this was never the right question in
the first place. At the very least, the answer is such a highly qualified ‘yes’ that
we do better to pose another much more open question: what are the social
conditions and political arrangements which contribute to the reduction of
violence? We must include not just war related armed violence but wider
measures of violence, which actually account for most violence in the world.
There are clearly added difficulties when democratisation is taking place after
war and prolonged periods of authoritarian government. These legacies limit
the impact of democratic change on violence reduction and can even fuel new
forms of social violence. The inequalities associated with ethnic and other
group fragmentations are another significant variable. Elections are not enough
and can in fact be violence-inducing; wider institutional arrangements and
checks and balances are required as well as attention to the distribution and
meaning of citizenship. But finally, even in polities with fairly stable democratic
arrangements, and including so-called advanced democracies, violence
remains an actual and potential risk where individualisation (both economically
and socially driven) generates ruptures in previous social bonds without
countervailing efforts to build common civil bonds, and/or where inequalities in
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group and individual opportunities remain high. If we take the North et al.
approach, we might shift the question entirely. Rather than regime form, we
might explore the agreements made between the powerful in any given society
and whether such agreements lead to states where the rule of law is valued or
where violence is merely contained through relatively fragile, transient elite
pacts. This approach is consistent with the findings of the VPC that despite
democratic institutions, violence remains an embedded form of human
interaction, in particular for the most marginal citizens but also – if not always
overtly – for the elites which control the polity. The rule of law and the
impersonal, rule-based use of violence are not priorities for elite coalitions bent
on managing their own competition and guaranteeing their rents.
These qualifications to our question are highly significant and raise important
issues about the formation and building of states and about the prospects for
meaningful democracy in contexts of high levels of violence, which is
constantly reproduced and diffused particularly amongst the poorest. Security
arrangements are an important measure of how the state responds to these
persistent violences and whether they are contributing to this reproduction and
diffusion. The next section explores some of the dilemmas around security
provision in some of the most violent ‘democracies’ in the world where the VPC
conducted its field research, and generates the second proposition to be
explored through the academic literature.
3 Do security policies and practices
reduce violence and deepen
democracy?
Our VPC field research revealed that security provision is protecting the
interests of some sectors of the population against violence by using violence
against other sectors, or by exercising active complicity or passive tolerance of
other non-state actors who do so. This dynamic is evidently linked to political
processes and contributes to shaping the nature of the state.
Across a range of contexts, the state’s security forces are seen to protect the
interests of the government itself, or of transnational or local private capital
allied to the state, rather than the public, especially the low-income or socially
marginalised public. The highest-profile case of this covered by DRC research
is the Nigerian Federation and certain States prioritising the protection of
transnational oil exploitation operations in the Delta region of Nigeria over and
above citizens’ protection and their basic welfare needs (Osaghae 2010; Abah
and Okwori 2006). Here zero-tolerance state protection of the oil industry
against vigilantism is seen to exacerbate sectarian tensions between citizens.
A variant closer to vigilantism is the Niger Delta militias, who quickly abandon
their discourse of representing citizens’ interests against predatory foreign
capital and become self-serving pariahs (Abah and Okwori 2006). A lower-
profile example of the same phenomenon is the case of alliances formed
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between state actors and local urban developers to harass and ultimately
dislodge slum-dwellers in Bangladesh (Kabeer and Haq Kabir 2009).
In inner-city Kingston, Jamaica, the police, far from investigating and
addressing crime, are reported to act as ‘gangstas’ or hired guns for those with
grudges against their neighbours (Moncrieffe 2008: 34). In Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil, as a historical legacy of the social positioning and methods of the police
under the twentieth century military dictatorships, many police ‘have not made
the transition from protecting the state, as was their role in the time of
dictatorship, to protecting its citizenry, and especially its low-income citizenry,
who continue to be treated as the enemy, as was the left during the military
regime’ (Leeds 2007: 28).
In many of the settings researched, insecurity relating to state action or
inaction is occurring in a context of increasing privatisation of security. This is
part of the global tendency summed up by Luckham in which the state shares
the control of force with ‘a very diverse range of ‘non-state actors’: private
security firms, mercenaries, militias, self-defence forces, vigilantes and even
criminal mafias’ (Luckham 2009: 7). While the tendency responds to many and
complex global, national and local dynamics (Abello Colak and Pearce 2009),
abuses by state security forces such as those cited above contribute to the
acceptance and social legitimacy of vigilantes, paramilitaries, militias and
gangs. ‘Security’ functions may be delegated, officially or extra-officially, by
state to non-state actors, who may be legal or illegal; or they may be taken up
by non-state actors, operating in a vacuum where effective state action is not
forthcoming. These settings are thus characterised by uneasy mixtures of
forms of security provision and a fluidity of actors’ positioning within them.
To take the highly illustrative case of Rio de Janeiro, in 2005 groups of men
armed with police equipment began to invade and take control over favelas,
expelling or killing those associated with the drug trafficking factions, and
suppressing open drug trade. These militias, as the media have labelled them,
are composed of a mixture of off-duty, retired, or suspended military and civil
police officers, prison guards and firemen. Within two years of taking over the
first favela, the militias controlled 171 communities across the city (Wheeler
2009: 11). The militias pose an awkward problem for the city and state
governments, charged with the responsibility for public safety. On one level, the
militias appeal to the reactionary and politically powerful elements of society
that believe that more repressive policies are needed to halt the violence
spreading from the favelas to the rest of the city. On the other hand, the militias
are not under the control of the government and are testament to the lack of
accountability and corruption within the existing police and security forces. The
authority of some militias is increasing within favelas due to the way that the
militias use violence strategically to repress the drug trade. Other uses of
violence can detract from this authority. Their connections with the police and
the state also enhance their authority, as they are perceived as implicitly
sanctioned by the state. Their efforts to take control over existing patronage
systems, government benefits and other community-based organisations are
tactics employed to bolster their legitimacy and their control. Militia leaders
employ a discourse of providing social benefits and of non-violence as a
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means of building legitimacy more broadly, but in practice their perceived or
ascribed legitimacy relates to public security. ‘We are the legitimate community
leaders here – we are putting the residents’ association to rights, we are
organising things, because before there was a connection between the
[community] association and the traffickers’ (Wheeler, interview notes, Rio de
Janeiro, 14 December 2006).
In the township of Khayelitsha, South Africa, street committees that form to
address legitimate basic needs such as public service provision are prompted
by the lack of effective state crime prevention policies to stray into the realm of
extra-legal ‘security’ provision, to some residents’ relief and others’ disapproval
(Thompson and Nleya 2010).
DRC research which captured soaring levels of crime and fear in the township
of Khayelitsha, South Africa, did so against a backdrop of the Security Minister
declaring that citizens unhappy with the country’s security and crime situation
‘[…] can continue to whinge until they’re blue in the face […] or they can simply
leave this country’ (News24.com cited in Thompson and Nleya 2010). The
priority Khayelitsha residents give to crime debunks the prevalent narrative that
the social outcry over crime emanates from disaffected whites, rehearsed here
by the Security Minister. His statement can be read as the ultimate dereliction
of the state’s duty to protect, instead asserting that citizens who feel un-
protected should stop being citizens, by going elsewhere.
Analysts of violence have noted how state violence and tolerance of violence,
even when exercised in the name of security provision, tend to give rise to
mimetic forms of violence between citizens at many levels and in multiple
spaces of socialisation (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004: 1). Given the
prevalence of state violence or state-tolerated violence in all these contexts,
the generation of mimetic violence between citizens appears to be a further
way in which state action or inaction on violence reproduces rather than limits
it. In turn, this has serious implications for the exercise of meaningful
citizenship. DRC research has captured multiple instances of violence wielded
by some people against others in very diverse social settings. In some, the
victims are those perceived as outsiders or Others, for instance xenophobic
attacks against immigrant labourers in South Africa (Robins and Colvin 2010)
and mob violence between Christian and Muslim youths in Kaduna, northern
Nigeria (Harris 2009). In others, they are subordinates in gendered power
relationships within the household, for instance in urban El Salvador (Hume
2009), rural Mexico (Cortez Ruiz 2009) and Bangladesh (Kabeer, Huq and Haq
Kabir 2009; Huq 2005).
The gendered dimensions of the violent reproducing qualities of security
provision in the research sites are striking. Gender-based violence within the
home is an area on which many states have historically limited their own
jurisdiction or claimed that they have no effective influence. Across the VPC
and DRC research, gender based violence remains extremely high at the same
time as ignored by state security forces. Attempts by women victims in
Bangladesh to access justice or safety are met with state impunity (Kabeer,
Huq and Haq Kabir 2009). In El Salvador, the impunity is compounded when
state security actors respond to women victims’ pursuit of justice by appealing
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to idealised gender roles and family models, to dissuade the women from
pursuing their claims against the ‘father of their children’ (Hume 2009). There is
evidence of security forces encouraging the ‘male warrior’ ideal as part of their
security strategy: for instance, the Kingston police are reported to suggest
self-protective action to male youths who report violent incidents, by appealing
to macho self-images (Moncrieffe 2008: 34).
These examples illustrate the way violence is reproduced through state
security provision in the contexts where we carried out field research, and the
effects this can have on community, social and political life at the local level.
They lead us to our second proposition.
3.1 Security and violence: exploring the interface
Proposition 2: Security provision is not making people feel more secure.
State responses to growing levels of violence involve strengthening state
and non-state security actors committed to the reproduction of violence,
affecting disproportionately the poorest communities.
The provision of security and the legitimate monopoly of violence are two vital
components of state formation and building processes. Collier considers that
security alongside accountability is essential to a country’s development, and
societies of the ‘bottom billion’ have been unable to supply either (Collier 2009:
189). However, although Collier would undoubtedly argue that their high levels
of poverty and low growth make them the most important cases to focus on
round the world, it is not only the ‘bottom billion’ that are facing serious
problems with respect to these two key components of democratic
development. Many middle income countries are facing serious problems with
respect to both security and accountability. In such countries, higher average
per capita incomes mask high levels of inequality which shape the way security
is provided and to whom, the character of participation in politics and hence the
political accountability dimension, and ultimately the nature of the state and
citizenship.
As highlighted by VPC research, once the state loses or relinquishes its
monopoly of the legitimate use of violence, a range of implications for everyday
democratic citizenship ensue. ‘Partial policing’ and the privatisation of the
security function affect democratic citizenship on several levels. If the state’s
performance is looked at from the point of view of the security of ordinary
citizens, its interventions in the name of security are often responsible for
heightening insecurity. Unaccountable security and police actors, when not
themselves committing violent acts and crimes against citizens as in Rio, or
directly exacerbating violent outbreaks between different groups of citizens as
in the Niger Delta, are condoning violent reprisals as in Kingston, or
normalising gender-based violence, as in Bangladesh. The neglect of the civil
dimensions of democratisation lead Caldeira and Holsten to argue in respect of
the Brazilian democratic transition that:
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Although […] political institutions democratize with considerable success,
and although they promulgate constitutions and legal codes based on the
rule of law and democratic values, the civil component of citizenship
remains seriously impaired as citizens suffer systematic violation of their
rights […]. Narrowly political definitions of democracy – those that ignore
the civil component of citizenship and its constituent elements of justice
and law in the real lives of citizens and states – overlook these dilemmas.
(Caldeira and Holsten 1999: 692)
The authors conclude that the form of democracy which emerged from this is
‘disjunctive’.
Recent research as part of the Afrobarometer has measured the relationship
between public safety and the experience of crime and attitudes towards
democracy through national opinion surveys (Fernandez and Kuenzi 2006).
Between 2000 and 2003, overall satisfaction with democracy in Nigeria fell
from 85 to 34 per cent. Fernandez and Kuenzi find that perceptions about the
government’s performance in relation to crime reduction have a major impact
on their overall satisfaction levels with democracy:
it appears that […] Nigerians’ attitudes toward democracy are not so much
affected by objective conditions as by perceptions of government
performance. It is the perceived capacity of government to bring down
crime rates that appears to drive attitudes toward democracy, not personal
experience with crime.
(ibid.: 12)
Even if people have not directly suffered from crime, their perception of
whether the government is able to respond to crime and guarantee security is
central to their confidence in democracy.
We want to explore the possibility that it is not just the failure of the provision
of security as a public good, as in Collier’s argument, but that the problem is
the particular kind of security provision. Rather than a public good, such
provision has, in the contexts of VPC research at least, been aimed at
protecting and promoting partial interests, those essentially of the elite groups
who control or benefit directly from the state. This conclusion is somewhat
consistent with the above-cited arguments of North et al. according to which
the social orders concerned have protected the exclusionary interests of elite
coalitions rather than establishing legitimate violence-reducing mechanisms
which benefit all.
The VPC contexts of high levels of horizontal and other inequalities, some in
the midst of civil war or recovery from civil war, all raise serious questions
about the driving force behind state security policies. As described earlier, in
our field research we observed perverse relationships between state and non
state armed actors to the detriment of democratic process. As violence erupted
in Kingston, Jamaica in mid-2010, it was reported that the drug trafficker,
‘Dudus’ Coke, whose extradition provoked the armed violence between the
security forces and the trafficker’s followers, was known as the ‘president’ in
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the poor communities he controlled. The poor, it was reported, defended the
man who essentially governed them. He in turn was known to have close
connections with politicians, including the Prime Minister whose constituency
the trafficker controlled. A Guardian newspaper article quoted a woman who
had marched in support of Coke: ‘ “Dudus has been good to us,” says
Margaret, who will not give her second name for fear of reprisals. “He look
after us. Everyone. He is the government here (in Tivoli Gardens) because the
government don’t care about us, the poor. The government betrayed him”’
(McGreal: 2010).
There is a lot of evidence from other sources that current security approaches
in many parts of the global South do not work for the people who experience
insecurity most intensely, and that this encourages them to turn to various
forms of coercive authority for order. These are commonly the poorest, who
cannot afford private security provision and must depend on ill-funded and
often corrupt and abusive public security delivered through non-state armed
actors, in some cases contracted by the state. Where they are not state-
contracted, the state often turns a blind eye to their activities unless provoked
or pushed to act, such as in the case of the Jamaican drug lord when the US
pressed the government to extradite the individual.
Other academic case studies support this argument, such as a study of the
Bakassi boys and vigilantism in Nigeria (Smith 2004). This anthropological
study explored the relationship between the state and these vigilante groups
which by 2000 operated in several cities in south-eastern Nigeria, and which
gained the support of local politicians because of their popularity amongst
people for the instant justice they meted out to suspected criminals. Echoing
our own approach, Smith argues:
[…] the popularity of violent vigilantism in Nigeria must be understood as
part of a complex intertwining of peoples’ experiences of everyday violence
and the particular political structures and symbolic systems that both
produce this violence and provide the means to interpret it… it is
necessary to see this popularity as an act of political imagination – one
that simultaneously drew on the realities of everyday political violence that
underlie inequality in Nigeria while also distancing people from
them…understanding the complex confluence of political processes,
symbolic meanings, and everyday experience that can make some forms
of violence popular offers the best hope for constructing alternatives.
(ibid.: 449)
In the VPC research, we focussed a great deal on working with people who are
deeply troubled by the violence of their neighbourhood, using the DRC’s
‘seeing like a citizen’ approach. However, in the absence of security which
enables them to act as citizens, it was clear that many had come to accept the
security imposed by violent state and non state actors. Security provision, it
increasingly appears in these contexts, is extending the acceptance and use of
unlawful violence in the name of security provision. It is this process which
leads us to question whether the Weberian definition of the state is still
relevant to these contexts today.
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4 Conclusion
The VPC research focussed on everyday violences, but discovered that we
could not make sense of them in isolation from the political and security
environment provided by the state. Our research group worked initially in
relatively established democracies (Jamaica) and those who have made
transitions from authoritarian or single party regimes over the last two
decades.(Nigeria, Mexico, Brazil). The categories used here are the
established contemporary categorisations of political regimes, but they are
strongly contested by our findings. For our VPC publication on researching
violence (McGee and Pearce 2009), we incorporated other scholars, some
working in similar contexts (South Africa), and others in war-torn or war-
recovering countries (El Salvador, Sri Lanka and Colombia). All these cases
are lower-middle to middle-income countries. All have high levels of violence of
different kinds and security practices which appeared to be fostering violence
rather than diminishing it. Hence our exploration here of the relationship
between violence, security and democracy.
Recent research has already questioned the notion that democracy reduces
violence, particularly in the poorest countries and where horizontal inequalities
are entrenched. We have sought to broaden the argument. Violence persists in
democratic contexts, even as countries move out of so-called transition
phases. Regime form per se, especially when defined without reference to the
substantive and meaningful exercise of citizenship, does not enable us to
understand the logic of violence reproduction which we observed. We would
argue that in some contexts, the security policies aiming to address persistent
violences often perversely encourage them, and stunt the democratic
components of the polity, without necessarily implying a reversion to autocracy.
Democratic regime forms can co-exist with high levels of violence, and security
provision can perpetuate the latter rather than providing the conditions for the
former to develop. The risks of ongoing violence are true not only for the
poorest and war-torn countries of the world, concentrated in Africa, but also for
lower-middle to middle-income countries, where high levels of violence point
not merely to criminality and illicit activities but to some deep problems in the
interfaces between violence, security and democracy.
We contend that these problems reflect substantive challenges to the way state
formation and state-building processes have been traditionally understood and
how they are playing out in the world today. The VPC research suggests that in
some contexts today, the assumption of benign patterns of interaction between
violence, democracy and security needs to be rethought. Even in some
middle-income countries, the perverse interfaces between democracy, security
and violence are distorting the very logic of state formation and state building
as hitherto understood and hence the environment in which citizenship is
exercised. The notion – and emerging evidence – that elites can form coalitions
even in apparently democratic regimes, which then fail to legitimately mono-
polise violence over the territory, suggests that we cannot view states as
travelling on some inevitable trajectory towards a Weberian norm (Pearce
2010).
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One outcome is that citizens commit themselves less and less to the idea of
the rule of law, which in practice offers little protection, and search for their own
security provision. The state’s legitimacy as a political and social authority is
progressively weakened and the idea of democracy loses its appeal as a
political ideal. Non-state actors using force, whether contracted by the state or
autonomous or antagonistic to it, acquire an authority that is incompatible with
the exercise of democratic citizenship by all, and particularly by poor and
marginalised citizens who remain vulnerable to the inadequacies of publicly
provided security and the unaccountable actions of non-state armed actors.
We hope to have made a compelling argument about the perverse interfaces
between violence, security and democracy, and to have linked violence in a
counter-intuitive and counter-theoretical way with both security provision and
democratic state formation. Our conclusions point to the need for further
research, and in a different epistemological, methodological and analytical
mould from most existing research on the nature of democracy and processes
of democratisation.
VPC and DRC research has shed some light on the gamut of strategies
citizens adopt to cope with situations of violence and with their states’
responses to these. The strategies range from making do via self-protection
and self-censorship, through enlisting in other actors’ projects of alternative
‘security’, to outright rejections of the democratic nation-state project of which
they find themselves part. These strategies can be divided into those which
constitute constrained forms of citizenship, and those which constitute
struggles for ‘alternative’ citizenships beyond the confines of conventional or
legal channels. Both these kinds of strategy warrant more study, undertaken
from ‘citizen’ vantage-points. We need to rethink our categories and
assumptions, rather than try to fit the awkward facts into existing categories.
Seeing violence as citizens do enables us to see how neither democracy nor
security thinking are tackling one of the major constraints to human
development of our time.
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